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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of the Case 
This case concerns the obligations and conduct of a title insurance company toward its 
insured. Respondent Stewart Title Guaranty Company ("Stewart Title") issued a policy 
agreeing to indemnify the Appellant, Jerry Mortensen, for losses sustained by reason of a lack 
of access to his property. Mortensen's neighbor, Akers, sued him challenging his access 
rights. Stewart Title defended the case and took various steps to try to obtain access. Akers 
prevailed at trial. Stewart Title then paid Mortensen the policy limits and terminated its 
obligations to him. Mortensen appealed the Akers decision and sued Stewart Title in this 
action for fraud, breach of contract, bad faith, emotional distress, and punitive damages. The 
trial court dismissed all claims on summary judgment and awarded attorneys' fees to Stewart 
Title. 
Course of Proceedings Below 
Mortensen, acting pro se, sued Stewart Title Company of Coeur d'Alene on July 2, 
2007. R. Vol. I, p. 1. He was told that he had sued the wrong entity, but nevertheless refused 
to agree to substitute in the proper party defendant, Stewart Title Guaranty Company. Stewart 
Title Company of Coeur d'Alene moved for summary judgment in January 2008. R. Vol. I, p. 
131. Mortensen then retained counsel, who promptly agreed to substitute in Stewart Title 
Guaranty Company ("Stewart Title"), the Respondent herein. 
Stewart Title moved for summary judgment on February 19,2008. R. Vol. 11, p. 3 11. 
The motion sought dismissal of Mortensen's fraud and emotional distress claims based on the 
statute of limitations; dismissal of the breach of contract claim because the contract expressly 
allowed Stewart Title to do what Plaintiff claimed was a breach, and because Mortensen had 
been paid the policy limits and thus had no damages; dismissal of the "bad faith" claim 
because it cannot be bad faith to do that which the parties' contract allows; and dismissal of 
the punitive damages claim on the assumption that the other causes of action would be 
dismissed. R. Vol. 11, p. 296. The court granted the motion in its entirety, by order dated 
March 27, 2008. R. Vol. 111, p. 420. 
Stewart Title sought recovery of its attorneys' fees based on Idaho Code $41-1 839(4) 
and Idaho Code $12-123. R. Vol. 111, p. 501. It also sought recovery of its costs under Civil 
Rule 54(e)(5). R. Vol. Ill, p. 498. 
Mortensen moved to reconsider on May 8, 2008. R. Vol. 111, p. 505. The trial court 
denied the motion by order dated June 24, 2008. R. Vol. 111, p. 586. The court declined to 
award Stewart Title its discretionary costs, but awarded it $25,000 in attorney fees and 
entered judgment on November 19, 2008. R. Vol. 111, p. 605, 607. Plaintiff filed his Notice 
of Appeal on November 28,2008. R. Vol. 111, p. 627. 
This case is related to Akers v. Mortensen, et al, Kootenai County Case No. CV-02- 
222, which has been on appeal as Akers v. D.L. White Constr., Inc., 142 Idaho 293 (2005) 
(Akers I) and Akers v. Mortensen, Docket No. 33587133694 (Akers II). This Court filed its 
most recent opinion on January 22,2009. 
Statement of Facts 
Mortensen's claims relate to his efforts to develop property in the Coeur d'Alene area 
in the mid-1990s to early 2000s. He bought the property in 1994. R. Vol. I, p. 141 (72). 
Stewart Title underwrote an owner's policy in which it agreed, subject to the terms of the 
policy, to insure Mortensen "against loss or damage, not exceeding the Amount of Insurance 
stated in Schedule A, sustained or incurred by reason of," among other things, "lack of a right 
of access to and from the land." R. Voi. 11, p. 261. The "Amount of Insurance" stated in 
Schedule A was $200,000. R. Vol. 11, p. 265. Unbeknownst to Stewart Title, Mortensen 
bought the property in 1994 knowing there was a potential access problem. R. Voi. 11, p. 362 
(transcript pages 233,234). 
According to Mortensen, access to the property required crossing property owned by 
Dennis and Sherrie Akers. R. Vol. I, p. 2. Akers disputed Mortensen's right to cross. In 
November 2001, Mortensen sent a letter to North Idaho Title, the Coeur d'Alene area 
company that actually issued the Stewart Title policy. R. Vol. 11, p. 394. In that letter 
Mortensen states that he is "quite certain that the neighbor, whose property I cross, will 
prohibit me from using that access if he feels he has a legitimate reason to stop me or anyone 
else." R. Vol. 11, p. 394. Mortensen demanded quick action from North Idaho Title to "rectify 
the situation" and threatened legal action. Id. 
The matter was referred to John Holt, a Stewart Title Field Customer Service 
Representative from Boise. R. Vol. 11, p. 396. Holt handled the matter from 2001 until 2004, 
when threats from Mortensen led Stewart Title to obtain a restraining order to protect Holt 
from Mortensen and his partner, David White. R. Vol. 11, p. 256 (76), 282. 
Holt contacted the Akers in late 2001, pursuant to paragraph 4(b) of the policy, which 
gives Stewart Title the right to "do any other act which in its opinion may be necessary or 
desirable to establish the title to the estate or interest, as insured, or to prevent or reduce loss 
or damage to the insured." R. Vol. 11, p. 257 (71 I), 262 (74(b)). Mrs. Akers testified at the 
September 2002 trial that the purpose of the contact was to ask whether Akers would 
quitclaim a portion of her property to Mortensen. R. Vol. I, p. 218 (transcript p. 409, L. 20). 
Holt was unable to resolve the access issue. 
Akers filed suit against Mortensen and White in January 2002 alleging trespass, 
among other claims. R. Vol. I, p. 185. Mortensen tendered the case to Stewart Title, who 
retained attorney Michael Reagan to defend Mortensen. R. Vol. 11,256 (76), 257 (77), 398. 
Some time during the Akers litigation, Stewart Title obtained a triangular portion of 
property from an adjoining landowner named Baker. The property was quitclaimed to 
Mortensen. R. Vol. 11, p. 316 (712). Mortensen admits this was done "in an effort to solve 
this [the access] problem." Id. Mortensen also admitted that Stewart Title in fact believed the 
property belonged to Baker. R. Vol. 111, p. 516. Mortensen testified in this case that 
"Ownership of this triangular shaped parcel was disputed throughout the lawsuit started by the 
Akers." R. Vol. 11, p. 316 (712). Despite knowing about that dispute, he and White 
nevertheless "began making improvements" to that property. Id. Mortensen did not do the 
improvement work in reliance on the Baker quitclaim deed; if he did, that reliance was not 
reasonable given that he knew ownership was,in dispute. R. Vol. 11, p. 369 (transcript p. 262, 
L. 2-14). 
The Honorable John T. Mitchell presided over the trial and decided the case by written 
findings and conclusions issued January 2, 2003. R. Vol. I, p. 30. Mortensen alleged 
(correctly) that Akers prevailed at trial. R. Vol. I, p. 4 (724). (This Court has since ruled, 
among other things, that Mortensen in fact does have access. Substitute Opinion, Docket 
Number 33587/33694, dated January 22,2009.) 
Following trial Stewart Title and Mortensen debated whether to move to reconsider or 
appeal. Several letters were exchanged between counsel for the parties. Ultimately, Stewart 
Title elected not to proceed with the case. By letter dated May 14, 2004, Richard Mollerup, 
Stewart Title's lawyer, infbrmed Mortensen that the company would be paying him the 
specified Amount of Insurance ($200,000) and ending its obligations to him. R. Vol. 11, p. 
249. Mr. Mollerup sent Mortensen another letter, dated May 18, 2004, via Federal Express 
overnight delivery. R. Vol. 11, p. 251, 252. The letter told Mortensen that under the terms of 
the policy: "[tlhe payment or tender of payment of the amount of the insurance terminates all 
liability to defend, prosecute, or continue any litigation. Therefore, Stewart Title will not be 
prosecuting the appeal in Akers v. White and Mortensen." Id. A $200,000 check payable to 
Mortensen was enclosed with the letter. Id. The Federal Express record shows the May 1 8th 
package was delivered on May 19". R. Vol. 11, p. 253. In addition, nearly identical letters 
were faxed to Mortensen's lawyers. R. Vol. 11, p. 273, 274. Mortensen concedes that he 
received the letters and the funds. R. Vol. I, p. 4 ,5  (7727,29). 
Stewart Title had no further contact with Mortensen after Mollerup sent him the May 
18,2004 letter. R. Vol. 11, p. 241 (73), 244 (777-9), 258(112). 
ARGUMENT 
Mortensen correctly states the standard of review, except with regard to the award of 
attorneys' fees. When reviewing an award of fees, the Court freely reviews the trial court's 
decision as to which, if any, statute applies to the situation before it. Ransom v. Topaz, 143 
Idaho 641,644 (2006). Whether the particular statute used in awarding the attorneys' fees was 
applied properly to a given set of facts is a question of law and the standard of review is one 
of free review. Id. at 644 (citing Kidd Island Bay Water Users Coop. Ass'n, Inc. v. Miller, 
136 Idaho 571, 573 (2001)). Here, the trial court chose to apply Idaho Code $41-1839(4) and 
12-123. R. Vol. 111, p. 604. Once it is determined that the facts justify application of that 
particular statute, the trial court's award of attorneys' fees and costs is subject to review for an 
abuse of discretion. Id. at 643 (citing Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 486 (2003). "The 
awarding of attorney's fees and costs is within the discretion of the trial court and subject to 
review for an abuse of discretion." Id. 
A. All breach of contract claims were ttroperlv dismissed, regardless of theory. 
1. Mortensen was paid the full policy limits, so he has no contract damages and 
no contract-based causes of action. 
Mortensen has alleged several contract-based theories. He began the case by claiming 
Stewart Title breached the insurance contract by not handling the & appeal. See R. Vol. I, 
p. 1, 6. He lost that claim on summary judgment because the policy gave Stewart Title the 
express right to change its mind and quit defending the case. R. Vol. 11, p. 262 (policy section 
6(a)). Mortensen alleged a new theory on reconsideration in which he conceded that the 
policy allowed Stewart Title to take action to obtain access for him, but he claimed it did not 
do so diligently, in violation of paragraph 4(b) of the policy. R. Vol. 111, p. 515, 516; 
Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 10. Mortensen also alleged "Bad Faith," in which he claimed 
Stewart Title "failed to perform the terms of the insurance contract in good faith." R. Vol. I, 
p. 6. 
These contract claims all fail for the same reason: Stewart Title paid Mortensen the 
h l l  policy limits. The policy did not guaranty Mortensen access. Rather, it committed 
Stewart Title to indemnify Mortensen for losses "not exceeding the Amount of Insurance" 
that were "sustained by reason of a lack of access to and from the land." R. Vol. 11, p. 261. It 
is undisputed that the Amount of Insurance was $200,000 and that Stewart Title paid 
Mortensen that sum. R. Vol. 11, p. 265; R. Vol. I, p. 5. 
Idaho courts have long held that payment of the full amount of a title insurance policy 
terminates the insurer's obligations. See, e.g., Anderson v. The Tidle Ins. Co, 103 Idaho 875, 
878 (1982). In Anderson, this Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the title insurer 
because the insurer had tendered full payment of the policy limits. Anderson, 103 Idaho at 
876. The plaintiff alleged that his title report failed to disclose a conveyance of part of the 
insured property to a third party. Id The plaintiff refused the carrier's policy limits tender 
and sought damages for breach and negligence. Id. The Court found that the insurer had not 
purported to act as anything other than a title insurance company, and thus the negligence 
claims failed as a matter of law. Id. at 879. Plaintiff was limited to a recovery based on the 
contract. Id at 878-879. The court held that "[wlhere title to a portion of insured property 
fails, the insured is entitled to recover upon the loss up to the amount of insurance coverape 
under the policy." Id at 878 (emphasis added). 
Paragraph 6(a) of the Mortensen policy addresses the issue expressly, stating that upon 
payment of the Amount of Insurance: 
All liability and obligations to the insured under this policy . . . shall terminate, 
including any liability or obligation to defend, prosecute, or continue any 
litigation, and the policy shall be surrendered to the Company for cancellation. 
R. Vol. 11, p. 262. 
The language "or continue any litigation" plainly allows Stewart Title to terminate its 
liability to the insured during litigation. Thus, not only does Anderson make clear that 
payment of full policy limits is the maximum of the insurer's exposure, but the policy 
language itself provides that if the insured decides to pay limits during a case, as it did here, 
then its liability ends. 
Note too that paragraph 15 of the policy also provides that it is the only agreement 
between the parties and that "Any claim of loss or damage, whether or not based on 
negligence, and which arises out of the status of the title to the estate or interest covered 
hereby or by any action asserting such claim, shall be restricted to this policy." R. Vol. 11, p. 
263. 
Mortensen is barred from recovering more than the policy limits, regardless of 
contract theory and regardless of the meaning of the word "diligently" in paragraph 4(b). 
This assumes Mortensen's lack of diligence theory is indeed a contract-based claim. If, on the 
other hand, the diligence theory articulates a tort claim, that claim is time-barred. The trial 
court addressed this alternative scenario when it held that, "there is no dispute in the record 
that Plaintiff knew of the alleged breach by September of 2002; thus, the tort claim is barred 
by the four (4) year statute of limitations ..." R. Vol. 111, p. 587. More specifically, 
Mortensen became aware of the Stewart Title contact with Akers when Mrs. Akers testified at 
trial on September 11, 2002. R. Vol. 11, p. 214, 218; R. Vol. 11, p. 315 (71 1). He learned 
about the Baker quitclaim deed during the Akers litigation. R. Vol. 11, p. 316 (712). 
Morlensen did not bring suit until July 2,2007, more than four years later. 
This Court's January 22, 2009 Substitute Opinion made clear that Mortensen does in 
fact have access. The trial court in the Akers case now has to determine where the access is 
and how wide it is. Stewart Title did not make any representations or commitments regarding 
the nature or quality of the access. R. Vol. 11, p. 261-267. Again, Mortensen got all he was 
promised and then some: a defense, payment of the $200,000 policy limits, access. He 
has no claim for breach of contract, regardless of theory. 
2. Mortensen cites no record evidence to suvwort a claim for lack of dili~ence. 
Mortensen's "lack of diligence" claim fails because he cites no record evidence to 
support it. He instead simply relies on conclusory statements in his own affidavit. 
Mortensen's reconsideration brief leaned heavily on the supposed "facts" surrounding 
the Baker property. R. Vol. 111, p. 516, 517. Mortensen considered those events irrelevant 
when he testified in h e  Akers trial. R. Vol. 11, p. 369 (trial transcript p. 262, L. 2-14). In 
explaining his basis ibr thinking he had the right to improve the property, Mortensen testified 
that the Baker conveyance was "irrelevant:" 
Since that time, uh, for the simple fact that the title company, who defends us, 
thought that Mr. Akers might try to get Mrs. Baker to deed him that property, 
the title company hired a private investigator, located Mrs. Baker, who is the 
owner of that property, which is really kind of irrelevant because we have 
easement through that wrovertv whether she deeded it to us or not, but she then 
deeded us that property, so now not do we only own that triangular portion, 
we have always had an easement through that portion, so all we did was 
improve our easement area in there that we have a legal easement to which we 
now own. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Any lack of diligence by Stewart Title is irrelevant because it is clear that Mortensen 
did not rely upon the quitclaim from Baker. But, Mortensen offers no actual evidence of a 
lack of diligence. Arguments from his lawyer and self-serving, conclusory statements from 
Mortensen do not suffice to defeat an otherwise valid motion for summary judgment. 
Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894,897 (2007); I.R.C.P. 56. None of the underlined "evidence" 
that Mortensen cites is supported in the record: 
"Stewart Title told Mortensen and White that it had purchased the small triangle parcel from 
Kathryn Baker and placed it in their names so they could use it for access and could make 
improvements on it; it was theirs." R. Vol. 111, p. 516. emphasis added. 
"It did not place the property in Mortensen and Whites names as it claimed to have done." 
Id. emphasis added. 
"Mortensen and White built an access road across the small triangular parcel believing it 
was theirs and previously Ms. Baker's as Stewart Title had assured them . . ." Id. emphasis 
added. 
"Stewart Title convinced Mortensen, with a recorded deed from Baker that he owned the 
property and thus Mortensen used that property for an access road . . ." Id. p. 5 16,s 17, 
emphasis added. 
Mortensen cites no deposition or trial testimony to support these supposed statements, 
nor does he give any detail. He does not say who "told" him about the purchase from Baker, 
or whether it was really him or White who was told. He does not give any details to support 
the claim that Stewart Title said it "placed the property in his name." He does not say who 
"assured" him, or whether it was really him or White who was assured. He does not say who 
"convinced" him about the Baker property or when. Mortensen did not even provide a copy 
of the Baker quitclaim deed. His "evidence" is really just conjecture, argument, and guessing, 
which is why the trial court found the claims "clearly unsupported by fact or law" and 
awarded attorney fees to Stewart Title. R. Vol. 111, p. 604,605. 
Mortensen makes similar unsupported statements on appeal. See Appellant's Opening 
Brief, p. 4. The only evidence cited is Mortensen's own affidavit, which contains the same 
unsupported, conclusory statements as set out above and in the briefing below. See R. Vol. 11, 
p. 313, 316. Mortensen states that "Stewart Title recorded the Quitclaim Deed and 
represented to and assured me that I owned the triangular shaped parcel." R. Vol. 11, p. 316. 
He does not say who told him this or when. It is surprising indeed that he cannot provide 
such basic information if the representation and assurance in fact occurred. The Court should 
disregard Mortensen's contentions not just because they are uncorroborated and self-sewing, 
but also because they are simply too vague. Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746, 759 
(2006) ("[a] mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to 
create a genuine issue," the non-moving party must respond to a motion with "specific 
facts."). 
Regarding the Baker quitclaim deed, the Court should consider too that a quitclaim 
deed is not a warranty deed. A11 a quitclaim deed does is convey the grantor's interest in real 
property, w. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, p. 1251 (6th ed. 1990); Luce v. Marble, 142 
Idaho 264, 270 (2005). By contrast, a warranty deed is "a deed in which grantor warrants 
good, clear title. A deed which explicitly contains covenants concerning the quality of title it 
conveys." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, p. 1589 (6th ed. 1990) Given that a quitclaim deed 
does not warrant title, the fact that Baker, as it turned out, did not have title, does not bear on 
"diligence." Stewart Title never said Baker had title. All that can be inferred from the 
evidence is that Stewart Title told Mortensen that "you have title if Bakers had title." 
Mortensen admits, however, that title to the Baker property was in dispute throughout the 
Akers trial, so he obviously did not reasonably rely on having title. R. Vol. 11, p. 316. The 
truth is that Mortensen did not believe the Baker deed gave him anything he did not already 
have. See R. Vol. 11, p. 369 (transcript p. 262, L. 2-14). The evidence establishes that 
Mortensen relied on his easement rights for access, not on the Baker deed. Id. But Mortensen 
knows he has already been compensated for Stewart Title's alleged error relating to the 
easement, so he is trying to recast the claim as being based on the Baker deed. His claim is 
without merit. 
Mortensen's "evidence" about Stewart Title's contact with Akers has the same 
shortcomings. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 3, 4. With one exception, all the evidence 
consists of is unsupported statements from the same Affidavit of Plaintiff Vernon Jerry 
Mortensen (found at R. Vol. II, p. 313). The one exception is the statement that John Holt 
contacted Akers in late 2001. Holt does not say what the parties discussed. R. Vol. I, p. 105; 
R. Vol. 11, p. 257. For whatever reason, Mortensen chose not to depose Holt. 
Regarding Akers, Appellant's Opening Brief relies on the following unsupported 
statements from Mortensen's Affidavit: 
6. Sometime thereafter Stewart Title Guarantee Company, based 
upon information and belief, recognized the existence of a problem relating to 
my legal right to access my property, and the Whites' legal rights of access to 
the parcel I deeded to them. 
7.  Thereafter, Mr. John Holt, acting on behalf of Stewart Title, 
contacted Dennis and Sheni Akers and offered to purchase from them a small 
parcel of property and notified Akers that Stewart Title needed that small 
parcel to provide legal access and easement to my property and the property I 
conveyed to the Whites. According to Mr. Holt's affidavit, he made the above 
referenced contact sometime in late 2001. 
8. Stewart Title failed andlor refused to notify or inform me in any 
way that it believed there was an accessleasement problem, that it had talked to 
the Akers in an effort to cure the access/easement problem or that it tried to 
purchase property from Akers to fix the problem. This information was 
entirely kept secret from me by Stewart Title. 
9. Once Stewart Title notified the Akers of the access problem, it 
triggered the Akers to file suit against me for, among other things, trespass. 
The key portions of this are entirely unsupported by record evidence. Mortensen cites 
no testimony that Stewart Title "recognized the existence of problem," no evidence of what 
was offered or said to Akers, and no evidence that the contact in fact "triggered" Akers to file 
suit. Akers testified at trial. John Holt could have. Both were available for deposition in this 
case. So, presumably, was Baker. Yet Mortensen does not cite any of their testimony and did 
not take any depositions in this case despite having filed the case over seven months before 
Stewart Title filed its motion for summary judgment. 
Mortensen claims he was not notified of Stewart Title's contact with Akers. The 
policy gives him no right to notice (See R. Vol. 11, p. 262), and he cannot show how that 
supposed fact is material or how it changed his conduct or the outcome. He doesn't even try. 
Moreover, Mortensen concedes that the contact with Akers and Baker was done in an effort to 
help him. R. Vol. 11, p. 315 (f/8), 316 (712). Given that Stewart was actively trying to solve 
Mortensen's alleged problem, it is hard to see how that shows a lack of diligence. Mortensen 
offers only assertions - but no evidence - to the contrary. 
Mortensen has not and cannot support his diligence theory. There are no genuine 
issues of material fact in the record. Summary judgment was appropriate. 
3. The policy gave Stewart Title the right to refuse to handle the apveal. so 
Mortensen's initial contract claim fails. 
Mortensen initially claimed Stewart Title breached the insurance contract by failing to 
handle ( ie .  pay for) the Akers appeal. It is not clear whether that theory is part of this appeal. 
If it is, it should be dismissed because he was paid the full policy limits. Moreover, 
Mortensen has no claim for breach of contract unless he can prove that the title policy 
required Stewart Title to "defend him throughout" the Akers case. As the trial court found, 
the policy contains no such requirement. R. Vol. 11, p. 424. 
The policy allows Stewart Title to do the very thing that Mortensen claims is a breach: 
elect, during litigation, to pay the amount of insurance and end its obligations. R. Vol. 11, p. 
262(f/6). "Where the language of an insurance policy is susceptible to but one meaning, it 
must be given that effect." McGilvray v. Farmers New World Life Ins., 136 Idaho 39, 44 
(2001). Mortensen never pointed to any specific provision that he claimed was ambiguous. A 
party does not breach a contract or implied covenant by merely standing upon the terms of a 
contract. Peachtree Settlement Funding v. Wiggins (In re Wiggins), 273 B.R. 839, 878 
(Bankr. D. Idaho 2001) (Westlaw, p. 40); Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 
Inc., 121 Idaho 266,288 (1991). 
4. The letters from Stewart Title and Richard Mollerup did not modify the 
insurance contract so as to give Mortensen a right to a free appeal. 
The letters Stewart Title and its lawyer, Richard Mollerup, sent to Mortensen did not 
modify the policy. A contract cannot be modified without an agreement between the parties. 
Brand S. Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 733 (1981); Wright v. Johnson, 101 Idaho 208, 211 
(1980). Any new terms must be complete, definite, and certain. Giacobbi Square v. Pek 
Corp., 105 Idaho 346,348 (1983). 
The letters state in several places that Stewart Title may move to reconsider "and/or" 
appeal, thereby making clear that Stewart Title was keeping its options open. Specifically, in 
its January 24, 2003 letter to Mortensen, Stewart Title stated: 
As stated in previous correspondence, the Motion for Reconsideration and/or 
Appeal will he decided shortly after the Order is certified as final. In the 
interim before the Order is finalized, we will continue to weigh the value in 
each option. 
Mollerup's February 19, 2003 letter is to the same effect and makes clear that any 
decision will be made in consultation with Mortensen and his attorney, not simply between 
StewartiMollerup and Mortensen: 
Stewart Title intends to continue to provide you with a defense to all claims in 
the lawsuit throughout the damage phase of the trial and possible (sic) a motion 
for reconsideration or an appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. The decision to 
file post-trial motions or appeals will be made in consultation with Mr. Reagan 
and you based upon the likelihood that specific issues decided in the District 
Court may be successfully appealed. This firm will not get involved in those 
issues because we do not represent you in that lawsuit. 
R. Vol. 11, p. 325,326. 
These letters told Mortensen that an appeal was simply one of the options. The policy 
also makes clear that Mollerup lacked authority to unilaterally commit Stewart Title to 
handling an appeal: 
No amendment of or endorsement to this policy can be made except by a 
writing endorsed hereon or attached hereto assigned by either the President, a 
Vice President, the Secretary, an Assistant Secretary, or validating officer or 
authorized signatory of the Company. 
R. Vol. 11, p. 263(115(c)). 
That did not occur here. 
Mortensen also points to specific language in Moilerup's March 26, 2003 letter that 
refers to a prior commitment having been made regarding an appeal. The prior commitment 
referred to is the above-quoted language in Mollerup's February 19,2003 letter. R. Vol. 11, p. 
329-33 1. The February letter conlains no commitment, certainly not one definite enough to 
modify a contract. Like the previous letters, the March 26th letter makes clear that several 
issues remain to be resolved and that the parties will need to consult with Mortensen's 
counsel, Mike Reagan. Both the February and the March letter, when read in context, make 
clear that no definitive promise was made and that Stewart Title was reserving its rights. 
Mortensen also relies on language set out in a March 17, 2004 letter from John Holt. 
Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 5; R. Vol. 11, p. 323. That letter was written to David White, 
not Mortensen. R. Vol. 11, p. 323. The only insurance contract that could be modified by a 
letter to White is White's contract, not Mortensen's. Moreover, the language of the letter is 
conditional. It discusses what might happen "iP' the judge "perpetuates his original findings 
and conclusions." Id. Such a statement is insufficiently definite to modify a contract. See 
Brand S. Corp., 102 Idaho 731,733; Wright, 101 Idaho 208,211. 
The Court should simply ignore Mortensen's unsupported statement that John Holt 
made statements to him over the phone. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 5. Mortensen 
provides no detail regarding what Holt supposedly said or when. Such flimsy allegations 
cannot defeat summary judgment. Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 897 (2007); Gibson, 142 
Idaho 746,758 (2006). 
Consideration is also required for new contract terms. Brand S. Corp., 102 Idaho 73 1, 
733. Mortensen presents no evidence of having given anything in exchange for the supposed 
right to have Stewart Title handle the appeal. 
"Judgment shall be granted to the moving party if the non-moving party fails to make 
a showing sufficient to establish an essential element to the party's case." Spur Products 
Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 143 Idaho 812, 815 (2007). Mortensen has failed to establish 
essential elements required for contract modification, namely definite terms and 
consideration. The trial court correctly rejected his claim to the contrary. 
B. Mortensen failed to plead or even analvze quasi-esto~~el, and the policy 
authorized Stewart Title's actions. so those actions cannot be unconscionable. 
Mortensen's quasi-estoppel claim should be rejected because it was never pleaded. 
Rice v. Litster, 132 Idaho 897, 901 (1999); Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 669 (Ct. App. 
1984) ("issues considered on summary judgment are those raised by the pleadings...") 
Mortensen never even briefed or analyzed the issue -not even on reconsideration. Instead, he 
simply argued at the reconsideration hearing that Stewart Title's conduct was unconscionable. 
He cited no case law until this appeal. See R. Vol. 111, p. 518, 519. 
Moreover, as the trial court stated in its opinion on reconsideration: 
Not only was this theory not pled by Plaintiff, but there is no evidence in the 
record to establish that Defendant's change of position was an unconscionable 
act given that Defendant's paying Plaintiff the policy limits was expressly 
provided for in the insurance contract. 
The insurance contract gave Stewart Title the right to defend or pay policy limits and 
terminate its obligations. R. Vol. 11, p. 262 (7/6(a)). Here, Stewart did both. The contract also 
gave Stewart Title the right to contact Akers and Baker and try to resolve the access issue 
through them. R. Vol. 11, p. 262 (14(b)). Indeed, Mortensen urged exactly that. R. Vol. 11, p. 
394. Conduct expressly allowed by the contract cannot be "unconscionable." Peachtree 
Settlement Funding, 273 B.R. 839, 878. Conduct is "unconscionable" only if it is "not guided 
or controlled by conscience" or is "unscrupulous." www.merriam-webster.com. There is 
absolutely no evidence before the court that Stewart Title did something inappropriate, much 
less something "unscrupulous." Mortensen admits Stewart was trying to solve the problem, 
not cause it. R. Vol. 11, p. 315 (78), 316 (712). 
Mortensen relies upon thepossibility that he may not have gotten a copy of his policy. 
Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 13. Central to his argument is his lawyer's statement that 
"Stewart Title has not presented any facts to the contrary." Id. This is untrue. Michelle Fink 
of North Idaho Title testified that "it has been our practice, including in 1994, to provide our 
customers such as Mr. Mortensen with their policies of title insurance (including the policy 
jacket) in the mail after close of escrow." R. Vol. 11, p. 345. Mortensen has presented no 
evidence that North ldaho Title would not have followed that policy in his case. A11 
Mortensen has said is that he does not know whether he got a copy of his policy. In other 
words, he very well may have gotten it and the evidence shows that he probably did. In 
addition to the Fink testimony, the letters that Stewart Title sent to Mortensen discuss the 
terms of the policy in detail, suggesting strongly that Mortensen had a copy of it. See e.g. R. 
Vol. 11, p. 320, 325, 396, 398, 404. Again, neither Mortensen's speculation nor his lawyer's 
unsupported statements can defeat a motion for summary judgment. In any event, whether 
Mortensen got the policy is immaterial because he is not trying to defeat coverage. Whether 
he got the policy does not bear on unconscionability. 
The Holt and Mollerup letters do not create a foundation for an estoppel claim either 
because Mortensen has not shown that he was disadvantaged by, or changed his position in 
reliance on, Stewart's decision not to continue with the appeal. After all, Stewart Title 
defended Mortensen, including with a motion to reconsider, at no cost to him. R. Vol. 11, p. 
257 (77). It was not until the time to appeal that Stewart Title terminated its obligations to 
Mortensen. But Mortensen did not lose his right to appeal, he merely lost the benefit of 
Stewart paying for that appeal. He would have appealed either way, so he did not change his 
position or rely on his supposed belief that his appeal would be free. 
Finally, Stewart Title's letters made clear that it was waiting on the outcome of the 
motion to reconsider. That decision came on April 1, 2004. R. Vol. I, p. 58. Stewart Title 
did not delay, as was the case in Boise Motor Car Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 62 
Idaho 438 (1941). Note too that the delay in Boise Motor Car forced the insured to hire 
counsel. Id., at 448. That was not the case here. Mortensen has shown no reliance and no 
change of position based on the letters at issue. 
C. The emotional distress claim is untimely because the complained of conduct 
ceased more than two years before Mortensen filed suit. 
Mortensen's fifth cause of action seeks relief for emotional distress based on "Stewart 
Title's reckless and negligent actions." R. Vol. I, p. 6, 7. The statute of limitations for 
emotional distress claims is two years. Idaho Code 5 5-219. For purposes of the statute of 
limitations, intentional infliction of emotional distress is a continuing tort. Curtis v. Firth, 123 
Idaho 598, 604 (1993). "By its very nature this tort will often involve a series of acts over a 
period of time, rather than one single act causing severe emotional distress." Id., 123 Idaho at 
604. A continuing tort is defined as: 
one inflicted over a period of time; it involves a wrongful conduct that is 
repeated until desisted, and each day creates a separate cause of action. A 
continuing tort sufficient to toll a statute of limitations is occasioned by 
continual unlawful acts, not by continual ill effects from an original 
violation.. . . 
Id., 123 Idaho at 603, citing 54 C.J.S. Limitations ofActions 5 177, at 231 (1987), 
(emphasis added). 
When a continued injury is involved, the cause of action accrues when the conduct 
ceases. Id. The continuing tort concept, however, is not intended to, "[tlhrow open the doors 
to permit filing these actions at any time. The courts that have adopted this continuing tort 
theory have generally stated that the statute of limitations is only held in abeyance until the 
tortious acts cease." Id at 604. 
It is undisputed that Stewart Title terminated its obligations to Mortensen by letter 
dated May 18, 2004. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 6. That letter was faxed to his 
lawyers on the lgth and sent to him that day by overnight mail. R. Vol. 11, p. 269-274. 
Mortensen therefore got the letter no later than May 19, 2004. Mortensen knew on that date 
(if not before) that Stewart Title was not going to defend him through an appeal. It is also 
undisputed that no further communications occurred between Stewart Title and Mortensen 
after the May 18, 2004 letter. R. Vol. 11, p. 241 (73), 244 (777, 8, 9), 258 (712). Mollerup's 
billing records show no time entries on this matter after May 27,2004. R. Vol. 11, p. 244 (79). 
Furthermore, none of the facts set forth in the Complaint are alleged to have occurred after 
that date. Assuming, arguendo, that Stewart Title engaged in continuous tortious conduct 
prior to May 18, 2004, any claims based upon such conduct would be barred pursuant to 
Curtis and Idaho Code $5-219. 
Mortensen misconstrues the implication of a continuing tort. Under Idaho law, a 
cause of action accrues for a continuing tort when the conduct ceases. Cobbley v. City of 
Challis, 138 Idaho 154, 157 (2002); Glaze v. Defffenbaugk, 144 Idaho 829 (2007); Curtis, 123 
Idaho 598,603 (emphasis added). Mortensen's appeal brief mistakenly focuses on the effects 
of the conduct. Appellant's Opening Brief, p.15. That is simply the wrong analysis. The 
limitation period does not continue simply because the claimant continues to suffer ill effects 
from the conduct. Cobbley, 138 Idaho at 157-1 58. 
D. The "lack of diligence" theorv was aroverlv dismissed regardless of whether it 
alle~es breach of contract or a tort: whether it is imalied into the Complaint is 
irrelevant. 
Mortensen's argument regarding "modern pleading" and so-called notice pleading 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 16) misses the point. The "lack of diligence" argument was properly 
dismissed regardless of whether it alleged a contract claim or a tort claim, so it is irrelevant 
whether liberal pleading standards imply it into the Complaint. The trial court's point on the 
"lack of diligence" argument was simply that it was not included as part of the claim entitled 
"Breach of Contract." R. Vol. 111, p. 587. The point is impossible to refute. The claim was 
pleaded as: 
COUNT THREE - BREACH OF CONTRACT 
37. Stewart Title and Mortensen had a contract by virtue of the Title 
Insurance Policy, insuring access to the Mortensen Property. 
38. Stewart Title was obligated to defend Mortensen throughout the 
Lawsuit, including the appeal and subsequent proceedings in 
order to defend Mortensen's access over the Access Road. 
39. Stewart Title failed to fully defend Mortensen in the Lawsuit, 
breaching the parties' contract. 
40. As a result of Stewart Title's breach of contract, Mortensen has 
been damaged in an amount in excess of $400,000.00. 
Mortensen's Breach of Contract claim is plainly based on Stewart Title not handling 
the appeal, not whether it acted diligently in dealing with Akers and Baker. Interestingly, this 
cause of action does not incorporate the allegations set forth in the Factual Allegations section 
of the Complaint, but instead purports to stand on its own. Mortensen's other allegations are 
presumably not part of this cause of action. 
The trial court's opinion on reconsideration goes on to say that Mortensen's "bad 
faith" claim "alleges a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing for failing to 
perform the terms of the contract diligently." As established in Sections A(]) and A(2) above, 
all of Mortensen's contract-based claims, including this one, were properly dismissed for an 
absence of damages and an absence of record evidence. 
Even if, as the trial court suggests, "[Tlhis particular bad faith claim, therefore, lies in 
tort," the claim would be time-barred because: 
There is no dispute in the record that Plaintiff knew of the alleged breach by 
September of 2002; thus, the tort claim is barred by the four(4) year statute of 
limitations as previously cited by the Court in its Memorandum Decision Re 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
R. Vol. 111, p. 587. 
Mortensen cannot ascribe error to the trial court because the diligence claim is either a 
contract claim for which there is no damage and no evidence, or it is a time-barred tort claim. 
This Court is not bound by the exact rationale explained in the trial court's written decision. 
In Re Estate o f  Bagley, 1 17 Idaho 1091, 1093 (Ct. App. 1990). It is of no consequence 
whether the standards of "modern pleading" allow the lack of diligence theory to be read as a 
part of the Breach of Contract cause of action. The trial court should be affirmed. 
E. Award of $25.000 in fees. 
The trial court awarded Stewart Title $25,000 in attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code 
$41-1 839(4), which provides that: 
4) Notwithstanding any other provision of statute to the contrary, this section 
and section 12-123, Idaho Code, shall provide the exclusive remedy for the 
award of statutory attorney's fees in all actions between insureds and insurers 
involving disputes arising under policies of insurance. Provided, attorney's 
fees may be awarded by the court when it finds. from the facts presented to it 
that a case was brou~ht, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or 
without foundation. Section 12-120, Idaho Code, shall not apply to any actions 
between insureds and insurers involving disputes arising under any policy of 
insurance. 
Idaho Code $41-1839(4), (emphasis added). 
This case was brought "unreasonably and without foundation." The trial court cited 
the frivolous claims statute as well, and Stewart concurs in that. The statute provides: 
Frivolous conduct means conduct of a party to a civil action or of his counsel 
of record that satisfies either of the following: (i) It obviously serves to harass 
or maliciously injure another party to the civil action; (ii) It is not supported in 
fact or warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by a good faith 
argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. 
Idaho Code 5 12-1 23, emphasis added. 
Mortensen produced almost no evidence in this case and took no steps to obtain 
evidence. His claims were not supported in fact. His tort claims were not supported by law. 
The trial court found that Mortensen's claims were either untimely or "clearly unsupportable 
by fact or law." R. Vol. 111, p. 604 (a111 (2)). 
"The awarding of attorney's fees and costs is within the discretion of the trial court 
and subject to review for an abuse of discretion." Ransom, 143 Idaho 641, 643 (2006). 
When deciding whether the particular statute used in awarding the attorney's fees was applied 
properly to a given set of facts is a question of law and the standard of review is one of free 
review. Id. at 644 (citing Kidd Island Bay Water Users Coop. Ass'n, Inc. v. Miller, 136 Idaho 
571,573 (2001)). 
As shown above, Mortensen failed to produce any evidence to support his claims 
regarding Stewart Title's contacts with Akers and Baker. He took no depositions and cited no 
trial testimony to establish the facts he needed to prove his claims. His claims were utterly 
unsupported, and thus were not "supported in fact" as required by Idaho Code 512-123. His 
tort claims were clearly time-barred. The emotional distress claim is addressed above. The 
fraud claim, not on appeal here, was also unsupported by evidence and was clearly filed too 
Iate. 
Stewart Title incurred significant fees in this case for several reasons. First, 
Mortensen named Stewart Title Company of Coeur d'Alene as the defendant. Despite being 
told he had sued the wrong entity, he refused to substitute in Stewart Title Guaranty Company 
and forced a motion for summary judgment to be filed. R. Vol. I, p. 20-132. Mortensen then 
retained counsel, who stipulated to the substitution, so no hearing was required. Second, 
Mortensen has advanced new and different theories of the case, forcing Stewart Title to try to 
hit a moving target. The late-coming "lack of diligence" theory is but one example. Third, 
Stewart Title's counsel was required to review pleadings and rulings in the Akers litigation, 
which were significant. 
The fee award was justified and reasonable for these reasons, and should be upheld. 
F. Fees on appeal. 
Stewart Title requests its fees and costs on appeal under IAR 41 and IAR 35(a)(5) for 
the reasons set forth in Section E immediately above. 
CONCLUSION 
Stewart Title respectfully requests that the trial court be affirmed and that it be 
awarded its fees and costs on appeal. 
DATED this 23rd day of July, 2009. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorneys for ~ e i ~ o n d e n t  
Stewart Title Guaranty Company 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 23rd day of July, 2009,I caused to be served two (2) 
bound, true and correct copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
Sam Johnson 
405 South Eighth Street 
Suite 250 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney f o r ~ e s ~ o n d e n t  
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Qui sentit commodum sentire debet et  onus ikwiy 
sentat k6madam senMyriy d6bat 6t 6wnasi. He who 
receives the advantage ought also to suffer the burden. 
Qui sentit onua sentire d e b t  et  commodum ikwiy 
sitnbt 6wnas senMyriy ditbat 6t k6madaml. He who 
bears the burden of a thing ought also to experience the 
advantage arising from it. 
Quisauis erit aui  vult iuriaconsultus haberi conti. 
i n e i  studiumumum velit a ~ n o c n n q n e  doceri lkwiskwis 
6hrat kwiv v5lt iGraskansQltas habiray kantinmwat 
st@Ewd(i)yim, v4lai 6y kwowk5gkwiy d&ay/. Whoev- 
er wishes to be a jurisconsult, let him continually study, 
and desire to be taught by every one. 
Quisquis praesumitur bonus; ?t semper in dubiis pro 
rw  respondend- /kwiskw& praz&Ewmabr b6wnas; 
6t kmpar in d(y)dwhiyas pr6w riyow rasplnd6ndami. 
Every one is presumed good; and in doubtful cases the 
resolution should be ever for the accused. 
Quit, v. To leave; remove from; surrender possession of; 
as when a tenant "quits" the premises or receives a 
"notice to quit." 
Notice to ouit. A written notice given by a landlord to 
his tenant; stating that the former desires to repossess 
himself of the demised premises, and that the latter is 
required to quit and remove from the same at  a time 
designated, either at  the expiration of the term, if the 
tenant is in under a lease, or immediately, if the tenan- 
cy is at  will or by sufferance. 
Quit, udj. Clear; discharged,. free; also spoken of per- 
sons absolved or acquitted of a charge. 
Qui tacet, consentire videtur Ikwiy tksat, kbnsenthy- 
riy vadiytari. He who is silent is supposed to consent. 
The silence of a party implies his consent. 
7 Qui taeet consentire videtur, ubi traetatur de ejus 
commodo ikwiy *at kbnsenthyriy vadiytar, yirwbay 
traektiytar diy iyjas k6madowi. He who is silent is 
considered as assenting, when his interest is at stake. 
Qui tacet non ntiqne fatetur, sed tamen v e m  est 
eum non negare ikwiy e t  ndn yirwiakwiy fatifiar, 
s6d *man viram &st iyam n6n nagitriyl. He who is 
silent does not indeed confess, but yet it is trne that he 
does not deny. 
Qui tam action Ikwiy tkm kkehanl. Lat. "Qui tam" is 
abbreviation of Latin phrase "qui tam pro domino rege 
quam pro si ips0 in hac park sequitur" meaning "Who 
sues on behalf of the King as well as for himself!' It is 
an action brought by an informer, under a statute which 
establishes a penalty for the commission or omission of a 
certain act, i d  that the same shall be recover- 
able in a civil action, part of the penalty to go to any 
person who will bring &ch action and the remainder to 
the state or some other institution. It is called a "qui 
tam action" because the plaintiff states that he sues as 
well for the state as for himself. U.S. v. Florida-Vander- 
bilt Development Corp., D.C.W., 326 F.Supp. 289, 290. 
See also False Claims Act; Whistle-blower Acts 
Qui tardius solvit, minus solvit ikwiy tivdiyas dlvat, 
mhynas sblvat/. He who pays more tardily [Wan he 
ought] pays less [than he ought]. 
Quitclaim, v. In conveyancing, to release or relinquish a 
claim; to execute a deed of quitclaim. See Quitclaim, n. 
Quitclaim, n. A release or acquittance given to one man 
by another, in respect of any action that he bas or might 
have against him. Also acquitting or giving up one's 
claim or title. 
Quitclaim deed. A deed of conveyance operating by 
way of release; that is, intended to pass any title, 
interest, or claim which the grantor may have in the 
premises, but not professing that such title is valid, nor 
containing any warranty or covenants for title. In a 
number of states, a deed which purports ta transfer 
nothing more than interest which grantor may have, if 
anv, at  time of transaction, and excludes any implica- 
tion that he has any title or interest in described realty. 
Sabine Production Co. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 
La.App. 1 Cir., 432 So.2d 1047, 1052. Under the law of 
some states the  grantor warrants in such deed that 
neither he nor anyone claiming under him has encum- 
bered the property and that he will defend the title 
against defects arising under and through him, but as to 
no others. Compare Warranty deed. 
Qui timent, cavent vitant Ikwiy Mymant, kkvant 
vhytantl. They who fear, take care and avoid. 
Qui tot- dicit nihil excipit ikwiy t6wtam disat 
nhy(h)al ithapat/. He who says aU excepts nothing. 
Quit rent. A rent paid by the tenant of the freehold, by 
which he goes quit and free,-that is, discharged from 
any other rent. 2 B1.Comm. 42. 
Quittance /kwitans/. An abbreviation of "acquittance;" 
a release (q.u.). 
Qui vult decipi, decipiatur ikwiy v6t ditsapay, 
dasipiyitytari. Let him who wishes to be deceived, be 
deceived. 
Qnoad hoe ikw6wed h6kl. Lat. As to this; with re- 
spect to this; so far as this in particular is concerned. A 
prohibition quoad hoc is a prohibition as to certain 
things among others. Thus, where a party was com- 
plained againet in the ecclesiastical court for matters 
cognizable in the temporal courts, a prohibition q d  
these matters issued, ie, as to such matters the party 
was prohibited from prosecuting his suit in the ecclesias- 
tical court. 
Quoad sacra ikw6waed kykral. Lat. A s  to sacred 
things; for religious purposes. 
Quo animo ikwlw &namow/. Lat. With what inten- 
tion or motive. Used sometimes as a substantive, in lieu 
of the single word "animus," design or motive. "The 
quo animo is the real subject of inquiry." 
Quocumqne mod0 velit; quooumque mod0 possit 
/kwowk5mkwiy m6wdow vhlat; kwowIdmkwiy m6wdow 
p6satl. In any way he wishes; in any way he can. 
1689 WASTE 
Lineal warranty. In old conveyancing, the kind of war- other persons. 2 B1.Comm. 39. Such was abolished in 
ranty which existed when the heir derived title to the 1971. 
land warranted either from or through the ancestor who War risk imwanm. See 
made the warranty. 
Warsaw Convention. Treaty concluded in Warsaw, Po- 
Pemonal warranty. One available in personal actions, land in 1929 of rn~=, including limitation of 
and arising from the obligation which one has contract- liability, for international air travel. united States 
ed to pay the whole or part of a debt due by another to a is a party to such treaty. 
third person. Flanders v. Sealye, 105 U.S. 718,26 L.M. Warseot lw6rskdtl, In Saxon law, a customary or usual 1217. 
tribute or contribution towards armor, or the arming of 
Special warranty. A clause of warranty inserted in a the forces. 
deed of lands, by which the grantor covenants, for him- warth. ~n old ~ ~ ~ l i s h  law, a customaw payment, sup 
self and his heirs, to "warrant and forever defend" the posed to be the same with wad.penny. 
title to the same, to the grantee and his heirs, etc., 
all -by, through, or the Wash. A shallow part of a river or arm of the sea. The 
grantor or his heirs, ~f the is against the sandy. rocky, gravelly, boulder-bestrewn part of a river 
claims of all whatsoever, it is called a bottom deposited on level land near mouth of a canyon 
warranty. See also Covenant. representing rooks and gravel washed down by a moun- 
tain stream. 
Warranty deed. See that title. 
Wash hank. A hank composed of such substance that it 
Warranty of fitness. Warranty by seller that goods sold is liable to he washed away by the action of the water 
are suitable for special purpose of buyer. See also thereon, so as to become unsafe to travelers on highway. 
Implied warranty of fitness under "Commercial Transac- Washington, Treaty ,,& A treaty signed on M~~ 8, 
tions", above. 1871, between Great Britain and the United States of 
Warranty of habitability. Implied warranty of landlord America, with reference to certain differences arising 
that the leased premises are properly maintained and out of the war between the northern and southern states 
are fit for habitation at  time of letting and will remain of the Union, the Canadian fiheries, and other matters. 
so during term of tenancy. Boston Housing Authority v. washout signal In railroad parlance, emergency signal 
Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831. meaning to stop immediately. Stinsan v. Aluminum Co. 
Under "implied warranty of habitability," applicable of America, C.C.A.Tenn., 141 F.2d 682,684. 
to new housing, builder-vendor warrants that he has wash sale. me offsetting sale and purchaae of the same 
complied with the building code of the area which the or similar asset within a short time period, F~~ income 
structure is located and that the residence was built in a t, purposes, losses on a sale of stock may not be 
workmanlike manner and is suitable for habitation, if equivalent stock is purched within thirty 
Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc., Colo.App., 563 days before or thirty days after the date of sale. I.R.C. 
P.2d 976, 977. See also Habitability. 8 1091. 
Wmanty  deed. Deed in which grantor warrants good, Transactions resulting in no change in beneficial own- 
clear title. A deed which explicitly contains covenants erahip. E m t  v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 186, 205,96 S.Ct. 
concerning the quality of title it conveys. In some 1375, 1386, 47 L.Ed.2d 668. A fictitious kind of sale, 
states, statutes impute warranties or covenants from the disallowed on stock and other exchanges, in which a 
use of specific words, such as "grant." The usual cove- broker who has received orders from one person to buy 
nants of title are warranties of seisin, quiet enjoyment, and from another person to sell a particular amount or 
right to convey, freedom from encumbrances and de- quantity of some particular stock or commodity simply ,i fense of title as to all claims. Compare Quitclaim deed. transfers the stock or commodity from one principal to 
the other and packets the difference, instead of execu- Warranty, voucher to. In old English practice, the 
ting both orders separately to the best advan* in ' I  a warrantor into court by the party each case, as is required by the ~ 1 e s  of the different (when tenant in a real action brought for recovery of 1. 
exchanges. Such practices of wash sales and matched such lands), to defend the suit for him. 
orders by brokers to give impression of active trading in 
Warren. A term in English law for a place in which such securities are prohibited by SEC. 15 U.S.C.A. 
birds, fishes, or wild beasts are kept. 5 78i(aXl). See also Sale. 
A franchise or privilege, either by prescription or Wash transaction. See Wash sale. 
grant from the king, to keep beasts and fowls of warren, waste. ~ & i ~ ~  or insction by a posmsar of land cawing i which are hares, coneys, partridges, pheasants, ek. urwonable injury to the holders of other estates in Atso any place to which such privilege extends. the same land. An abuse or destrnctive use of property I 
free warren. A franchise for the preserving and custody by one in rightful posseasion. Spoil or destruction, done I 
of beasts and fowls of warren. 2 B1.Comm. 39, 417. or permitted, to lands, houses, gardens, trees, or other 
This franchise gave the grantee sole right of killing, so corporeal hereditaments, by the tenant thereof, to the 
far as his warren extended, on condition of excluding prejudice of the heir, or of him in reversion or m n i n -  
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